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In response to concerns that jury awards in tort cases are excessive and unpre-
dictable, nearly every state legislature has enacted some version of tort reform 
that is intended to curb extravagant damage awards. One of the most impor-
tant and controversial reforms involves capping (or limiting) the maximum pu-
nitive damage award. We conducted a jury analogue study to assess the impact 
of this reform. In particular, we examined the possibility that capping punitive 
awards would cause jurors to infl ate their compensatory awards to satisfy their 
desires to punish the defendant, particularly in situations where the defendant’s 
conduct was highly reprehensible. Relative to a condition in which punitive 
damages were unlimited, caps on punitive damages did not result in infl ation 
of compensatory awards. However, jurors who had no option to award punitive 
damages assessed compensatory damages at a signifi cantly higher level than 
did jurors who had the opportunity to do so. We discuss the policy implications 
of these fi ndings. 
THE EFFECTS OF LIMITING PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS 
Cries for reform fi rst sounded in the 1970s and continue to the present day. The target 
of this attack is a tort liability system that many people (including insurance, medical, and 
pharmaceutical executives as well as legislators and judges) perceive as capricious, unpre-
dictable, and out of control (see, e.g., Chookaszian, 1997; Ellis, 1989; Parliman & Shoeman, 
1994). Much of the criticism centers on concerns about the perceived excessiveness and un-
predictability of jury damage awards. This uncertainty is generally believed to produce inef-
fi ciency in terms of businesses’ planning for risk-producing activities and in predicting the 
outcome of a case and negotiating a settlement (Baldus, MacQueen, & Woodworth, 1995).
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Despite evidence that effectively undermines the concerns about extravagant awards 
(e.g., Daniels & Martin, 1995; Koenig & Rustad, 1993; Ostrom, Rottman, & Goerdt, 
1996; Saks, 1992), tort reformers have ushered in a number of reform packages that they 
suggest will rein in runaway juries and effectively reduce their awards. Indeed, nearly 
every state legislature has enacted some version of tort reform including measures that 
cap or limit jury damage awards, elevate the standard of proof necessary for the award-
ing of damages, bifurcate punitive damages trials, allocate a portion of the punitive dam-
age award to the state, and amend the standard of review for excessive verdicts (Hurd & 
Zoller, 1994; Kershaw & Pernini, 1997; Koenig & Rustad, 1993). 
For several years in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the tort reformers seemed to be 
winning the war. A second phase of the battle may now be underway, however. In the past 
few years, the highest courts in at least eight states have struck down all or parts of these 
tort reform measures (Glaberson, 1999), and dozens of new challenges are making their 
way to state supreme courts across the country. State courts are invalidating parts of the 
tort reform packages that did not pass state constitutional muster and, in particular, those 
that effectively enable the legislature to interfere in a jury’s evaluation of the evidence and 
assessment of damages. 
THE LAW OF DAMAGES 
Damage awards are generally of two sorts: compensatory and punitive. Compensa-
tory damages are intended to return the injured party to the condition she was in before 
she was injured (to the extent that money can do so). These damages, in turn, have two 
components: economic damages that are intended to compensate the injured party for her 
economic losses, including medical expenses and lost earnings, and noneconomic dam-
ages that repay the injured party for diffi cult-to-quantify losses, including pain and suffer-
ing, emotional distress, disability, and loss of enjoyment of life (American Law Institute, 
1979). As Anderson and MacCoun (1999) note, the rationale behind compensatory dam-
ages is plaintiff-focused: the jury is to focus exclusively on the needs of the injured party 
and attempt to return her to a preinjury level of functioning. 
The second kind of damage award—the punitive damage award—is based on a whol-
ly different rationale. Its primary purpose is to punish the defendant for malicious, willful, 
or evil conduct and to deter that defendant and others from similar egregious misconduct 
in the future. (These awards serve several secondary purposes as well, including educa-
tion, retribution, and law enforcement [Owen, 1994]. They may also serve to reimburse 
the plaintiff for losses that are not recoverable as traditional compensatory damages.) 
Punitive damages are defendant-focused (Anderson and MacCoun, 1999): without 
regard to the plaintiff’s needs, the jury is to determine what amount of money will effec-
tively punish and deter the defendant. Although punitive damages are granted infrequent-
ly in civil cases (Daniels & Martin, 1995; Moller, 1996), they have captured a great deal 
of media attention (Bailis & MacCoun, 1996) and have been the target of numerous re-
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form measures. The present study examines the impact of one of those reforms, namely 
capping the punitive damage award. 
PROPOSALS TO CAP PUNITIVE DAMAGE AWARDS 
Some states impose an absolute upper limit on the amount of money that can be 
awarded as punitive damages. For example, Alabama imposes a $250,000 cap. Other 
states (e.g., Florida) impose a maximum permitted ratio under which punitive damages 
may be awarded in some ratio to the compensatory damages (typically two or three times, 
although punitive awards in Colorado may not exceed the compensatory award). Still oth-
er states (e.g., Nevada) simultaneously impose both kinds of limits. Finally, in some states, 
(e.g., Nebraska, New Hampshire, Louisiana, Washington), jurors are not allowed to award 
any punitive damages (Hurd & Zollers, 1994; Koenig & Rustad, 1993). 
Caps on punitive damage awards are widely perceived to be the most important of all 
legislative tort reforms (Weiler, 1991), yet they are also highly controversial. Galanter and 
Luban (1993) argue, for example, that punitive damages should be linked to the heinous-
ness of the wrongful act and have nothing to do with the amount of compensatory damag-
es awarded to an injured party. Thus, they oppose proposals that explicitly cap the puni-
tive award at some multiple of the compensatory award. Owen (1994) suggests that such 
arbitrary methods of measurement deprive the decision maker of the ability to tailor the 
punishment to fi t the particular wrongdoer and the wrongful act. Reform proponents, on 
the other hand, claim that these caps will reduce the size, variability, and unpredictability 
of punitive damage awards. Perhaps not surprisingly, little of this debate has been enlight-
ened by empirical investigation. 
By defi nition, of course, caps will effectively control the maximum amount that can 
be awarded in punitive damages (Robbennolt & Studebaker, 1999). However, we suspect 
that there may be a cost to this accomplishment in the form of higher and more variable 
compensatory damage awards in situations in which the punitive damage award is artifi -
cially limited. The present study examines that notion. 
Why might jurors infl ate their compensatory damage award when punitive damag-
es are limited? The task of assessing damages involves multiple and seemingly confl icting 
goals. Jurors must fi rst focus on the plaintiff and determine an appropriate compensato-
ry award to that plaintiff regardless of its impact on the defendant.1 Suppose, for example, 
that a plaintiff is injured in an accident because his car’s brake pads—ostensibly repaired 
by the defendant—had failed. In theory, it should not matter whether the defendant is a 
small locally owned automobile repair shop or the Ford Motor Corporation. Jurors should 
1 A  number of studies have shown that corporate defendants pay greater compensation than 
individual defendants in both actual (Chin & Peterson, 1985)and simulated trials (Hans & Ermann, 
1989; Wasserman & Robinson, 1980) although what might appear on the surface as a deep-pocket 
effect may actually be a defendant-identity effect (MacCoun, 1996). Wealthy defendants were not 
necessarily at a disadvantage. unless they were corporations as well. 
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award compensatory damages that fully and fairly repay the plaintiff for his losses relat-
ed to the defective brake pads. Jurors may then turn to the defendant and assess punitive 
damages against that defendant with little regard for the plaintiff or his needs. If the de-
fendant opted to forego adequate testing in the interests of saving money, that defendant 
should be assessed a reasonable punitive damage award. 
Unfortunately, jurors’ instructions do not make these distinctions and directions clear 
(Greene & Bornstein, in press). Rather, the instructions tend to explain the intended func-
tion of each kind of award but tend not to clearly guide jurors in how to address these 
complementary functions. The instructions make no distinction, for example, between the 
plaintiff and defendant focus that implicitly underlie the two kinds of damage awards. Un-
der these circumstances, defendant-focused concerns can cross over into the assessment 
of compensatory damages and plaintiff-focused concerns can cross over into the assess-
ment of punitive damages (Anderson & MacCoun, 1999). 
We suspect that this crossover might be especially likely to happen in situations in 
which punitive awards are capped and jurors’ ability to adequately punish and deter the 
defendant is effectively thwarted. Anderson and MacCoun speculate that jurors man-
age such confl icts through a process of equifi nality (Heider, 1958) whereby multiple 
pathways to a goal exist and when one pathway to a goal is obstructed, another is used. 
Thus, we suspect that when punitive damage awards are capped (or are not an option), 
jurors may use their compensatory damage award (the economic component of which is 
typically not capped) as a means of imposing punishment or promoting deterrence to-
ward the defendant. 
We further suspect that this crossover effect would be more prominent in situations 
in which the defendant’s conduct has been especially malicious (as opposed to less repre-
hensible) and in which punishment and deterrence may be particularly appropriate. Jurors 
who hear evidence of egregious conduct on the part of the defendant and who have scant 
or no opportunity to award punitive damages would be especially likely to feel that their 
ability to punish and deter has been thwarted. These jurors might be likely to augment 
their awards for compensatory damages. The present study tested these hypotheses. 
PARADOXICAL EFFECTS OF RESTRICTING PUNITIVE 
DAMAGE AWARDS 
In the time since Baldus et al. (1995) observed that the effects of caps had not been thor-
oughly tested, at least two studies have examined the impact of restricting punitive dam-
age awards (Anderson & MacCoun, 1999; Robbennolt & Studebaker, 1999) and one 
study has looked at the impact of capping damages for pain and suffering (Saks, Hol-
linger, Wissler, Evans, & Hart, 1997). We focus here on the studies of punitive damages. 
Anderson and MacCoun (1999) had mock jurors read the summary of a product li-
ability case. In one study, some jurors were allowed to make compensatory and punitive 
damage awards and others were instructed to award compensatory damages only. An-
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derson and MacCoun found that jurors who did not have the opportunity to award puni-
tive damages “compensated for this constraint” (p. 321) by infl ating their compensatory 
damage award. In a second study, they found no effect of the egregiousness of the defen-
dant’s conduct on the amounts of the punitive damage award or compensatory damage 
award in a case in which all jurors had the option to award punitive damages. 
Robbennolt and Studebaker (1999) conducted a more direct test of the capping issue. 
Their participants read a summary of a personal injury lawsuit and awarded compensatory 
and punitive damages. Punitive damages were capped at a low level ($100,000), a mod-
erate level ($5 million), or a high level ($50 million), based on pretesting of their case. 
The level of the cap on the punitive award had a surprising and signifi cant effect on the 
amount of the compensatory award; it acted as an anchor for the compensatory awards (as 
well as the punitive awards). As the level of the cap on punitive damages increased, the 
size and variability of the compensatory award increased as well. Thus, the compensatory 
award in the high-punitive-cap condition was higher than the compensatory award in the 
low-punitive-cap condition. 
THE PRESENT STUDY 
Our study borrowed elements from both of these previous studies. Like Robbennolt 
and Studebaker, we manipulated the cap on punitive damages. However, our manipula-
tions were simultaneously more restrictive and looser than theirs. Whereas those research-
ers examined hypotheses related to anchoring by selecting caps at the 10th, 50th, and 90th 
percentile of punitive damages awarded in pilot testing, our manipulations were more le-
gally driven and arguably more realistic. 
One-fourth of our mock jurors had punitive damages capped at $200,000 (a low lim-
it imposed in at least one state) and another fourth were told that their punitive damage 
award could not exceed their compensatory award (the rule used in Colorado). A third 
group had less restriction on their decisions than did participants in Robbennolt and 
Studebaker’s study: they had no cap whatsoever on the amount of punitive damages they 
could award (as is true in approximately half of the states). A fi nal fourth of our mock ju-
rors were not given any option to award punitive damages (as is the case in a handful of 
states). We predicted that compensatory damage awards would increase as limits on puni-
tive damage awards became more restrictive. 
Like Anderson and MacCoun, we manipulated the reprehensibility of the defendant’s 
conduct by describing either highly reprehensible conduct by the defendants or less repre-
hensible conduct. Neither Anderson and MacCoun (1999) nor Cather et al. (1996) found any 
effect of defendant egregiousness on compensatory awards when punitive damages were al-
lowed, but we wondered if the defendant’s conduct might affect the compensatory judgment 
in situations in which punitive damages were severely restricted or completely disallowed. 
Finally, unlike either of the other studies, we examined the effects of limiting puni-
tive damages across three different causes of action (personal injury, products liability, 
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and insurance bad faith). Punitive damages are awarded considerably more often in busi-
ness/contract cases and intentional tort cases than in other types of cases (Eisenberg, Go-
erdt, Ostrom, Rottman, & Wells, 1997) so our use of the insurance case is legally realistic. 
Although we did not predict case-related effects on damage awards, the use of different 
cases contributes to our ability to generalize from these data. 
METHOD 
Participants 
Participants were 320 undergraduate students at the University of Colorado in Colo-
rado Springs. Mean age was 24 years (SD = 7 years). Twelve percent of participants had 
previously served on actual juries, half in civil cases, and half in criminal cases. They 
were given either course credit or payment in exchange for their participation. 
Materials 
Juror questionnaire packets contained a consent form, preliminary instructions, one 
version (Reprehensibility [low, high] × Punitive Damage Limit [no limit, dollar limit, 
proportional limit, no punitive award]) of each of three trial summaries (personal injury, 
products liability, insurance bad faith) presented in the same treatment combination, and a 
verdict form for each case. 
Trial Summaries 
The trial summaries were approximately 1200 words long and consisted of opening 
statements, direct examination and cross-examination of witnesses, closing arguments, 
and jury instructions. They were based loosely on actual cases (e.g., the insurance bad 
faith case was tailored after Pacifi c Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Haslip, 1991). 
To control for order effects, the order of presentation of the case summaries was 
counterbalanced. There were eight versions of each trial summary. As outlined below, we 
described the defendant’s conduct as highly or mildly reprehensible and paired that ma-
nipulation with one of four limitations on punitive damages.2 
Personal Injury Case. This summary described a case in which the driver of an auto-
mobile had been injured when her car was struck by a truck on which the accelerator ped-
al had jammed. The plaintiff suffered shattered hip and pelvic bones, underwent multiple 
surgeries, nearly died from an intestinal infection while hospitalized, and was advised by 
her physician not to have any more children. In the Low Reprehensibility condition, the 
defendant trucking company had equipped a majority of its trucks with safety monitoring 
devices that recorded speed and times of operation, required frequent status reports, and 
2 Trial summaries are available from the authors. The manipulations of defendant reprehensibility 
were pretested and published in a previous study (Cather, Greene, & Durham, 1996). Thus, we are 
confi dent that these manipulations were perceived as intended.
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performed regular safety inspections. In the High Reprehensibility condition, only a mi-
nority of trucks had been outfi tted with safety monitoring devices, reports were seldom re-
quired, and drivers were indirectly encouraged to break safety rules regarding speed and 
time spent on the road. 
Products Liability Case. This summary described the case of a 12-year-old boy who 
was severely injured while operating a lawnmower. The boy’s left arm had been severed and 
his right arm had sustained extensive nerve damage. In the Low Reprehensibility condition, 
the defendant manufacturer had conducted considerable safety testing on the mower and 
had been notifi ed of only a few similar incidents. In the High Reprehensibility condition, the 
manufacturer had done little safety testing, had rejected the installation of an inexpensive 
“kill switch” on the product, and had received numerous reports of similar incidents. 
Insurance Bad Faith Case. This case involved the cancellation of a woman’s health in-
surance policy without her knowledge while she continued to pay the premiums. The plain-
tiff became aware of the cancellation only after she submitted hospital bills to the insurance 
company for reimbursement. (She had been hospitalized for 15 days for a kidney infection 
that resulted in kidney failure.) In the Low Reprehensibility condition, the insurance compa-
ny had cancelled her policy 2 months prior to her hospitalization, and the company’s com-
puter system generated a report every 3 months listing checks received for cancelled or non-
existent policies. In the High Reprehensibility condition, the policy had been cancelled 5 
years previously and the checks received were monitored only once a year. 
The trial summaries also informed participants that the defendant had previously 
been found to be liable and that their task was to determine appropriate damage award(s). 
They received pattern jury instructions outlining the purposes of both compensatory and 
(where appropriate) punitive damage awards and the general factors that they could con-
sider in determining these awards. The instructions were as follows (Colorado Jury In-
structions 3d:Civil, 1988): 
Compensatory damages are awarded to compensate the plaintiff for losses incurred 
as a result of the defendant’s actions. In determining such damages, you shall consider the 
following: 
(1) any noneconomic losses or injuries incurred to the present time, or which will 
probably be incurred in the future, including pain and suffering, inconvenience, 
emotional stress, and impairment of the quality of life. 
(2) any economic losses incurred to the present time, or which will probably be in-
curred in the future, including loss of earnings or impairment of earning capac-
ity, and reasonable and necessary medical, hospital, and other expenses. 
Punitive damages are awarded for the sake of example and by way of punishment. In 
arriving at an award of punitive damages, you are to consider (1) the reprehensibility of 
the conduct of the defendant, and (2) the amount of punitive damages that will have a de-
terrent effect on the defendant in the light of defendant’s fi nancial condition. 
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Finally, where appropriate, they were informed about any cap or limit that had been 
placed on their punitive damage award. The limits we used were as follows: (a) Dollar 
Limit, in which punitive damages were not to exceed $200,000;3 (b) Proportional Limit, 
in which the punitive damage award could not exceed the compensatory damage award; 
and (c) No Limit. (In reality, caps can be either explicit, e.g., jurors in Colorado are ex-
plicitly instructed that their punitive damage award cannot exceed their compensatory 
award or implicit, e.g., jurors in Florida are not told about limits imposed on their awards. 
We suspect that even if jurors are not directly instructed that punitive damages are capped 
at a certain level, they may nonetheless have this expectation from information available 
in the media, conversations with others, or from general knowledge of tort reform legis-
lation.) Jurors in a fourth condition (No Punitive Damages) served as a control condition 
and were not given the opportunity to award punitive damages. These jurors were nei-
ther instructed nor questioned about punitive damages. We were particularly interested in 
comparing the compensatory awards from the three conditions in which punitive awards 
were allowed (including the two conditions in which they were capped) to the compensa-
tory awards decided by this control group. 
Verdict Forms 
We asked mock jurors to assess compensatory and (except in the control conditions) 
punitive damages for each case immediately after reading the case summary and the ju-
dicial instructions for that case. Where appropriate, jurors were reminded of limits placed 
on their punitive awards. There were no caps on compensatory awards. After determining 
the award(s) for each case, jurors answered two sets of questions about the intended ob-
jectives of these awards. We wanted to examine the extent to which jurors intended their 
awards to meet various objectives related to damages. We asked participants to select a 
number on a 1–10 scale to refl ect the extent to which they intended each award (com-
pensatory and punitive) to (a) make up for the losses incurred by the plaintiff; (b) punish 
the defendant; and (c) deter the defendant and others from similar behavior in the future: 
1 (Not at all) and 10 (Very much). They answered these questions in reference to their 
awards in each case. (In the No Punitive Damages condition, jurors answered these ques-
tions only in relation to their compensatory damage awards.) 
3 This amount is statutorily imposed on punitive damage awards in Texas (although Texas juries 
also have the option to award twice the amount of economic damages plus an amount equal to 
noneconomic damages if that sum is more than $200,000, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, 
1999) and is apparently the lowest upper limit at which punitive damages are capped. We also note 
that this amount is considerably lower than the mean punitive damages awarded when these case 
materials were used for a different purpose (Cather et al., 1996). Thus, we were fairly certain that by 
using this low ceiling, we would cause jurors to feel that their ability to effectively punish and deter 
the defendant had been restricted. This situation would allow us to test the possibility that limiting 
punitive damages would affect judgments of compensatory damages. To what extent our data are 
dependent on the low cap we opted to impose is, of course, an empirical question. 
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Design and Procedure 
The design was a 2 (Defendant Reprehensibility) × 4 (Punitive Damage Limit) × 
3 (Case Type) mixed factorial. Defendant Reprehensibility and Punitive Damage Limit 
were between-subjects factors and Case Type was a within-subjects factor. There were 40 
mock jurors in each of the 8 cells. 
Participants were run in groups of 8–12. They completed informed consent forms, read 
the three trial summaries, and completed the verdict forms after each case. They were allowed 
to refer back to the case summary and jury instructions when deciding on their awards. 
RESULTS 
Because the distribution of damage awards was positively skewed, we normalized 
the data with a log-10 transformation. All subsequent analyses were conducted on the 
transformed data, although both transformed and nontransformed data are reported for 
ease of interpretation. 
To improve generalizability, we examined the effects of capping punitive damages 
across three cases. We did not intend to systematically evaluate these different causes of 
action and further, did not anticipate any main effects of case type or interaction effects 
with case type. Indeed, separate three-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) using com-
pensatory and punitive awards as dependent variables and Case Type, Reprehensibility, 
and Punitive Damage Limit as independent variables indicated no main effects or inter-
actions involving Case Type (all p’s > .90). Therefore, to clarify the results, we collapsed 
our data across the three cases and subjected them to various 2 (Reprehensibility) × 4 (Pu-
nitive Damage Limit) ANOVAs. 
Punitive Damage Awards 
Caps on punitive damages would obviously be expected to have their most direct ef-
fect on assessments of punitive damages. We examined these awards by conducting a 2 × 
3 ANOVA on the mean awards. There was a main effect of Punitive Damage Limit, F(2, 
234) = 12.42, p < .001, η2 = .10 and a main effect of Defendant Reprehensibility, F(1, 
234) = 8.51, p < .01, η2 =.04 on these data. The interaction was not signifi cant (p =.16). 
As expected, the mean punitive damage award in the No Limit condition (trans-
formed = 5.38, nontransformed = $1,579,000) was signifi cantly higher than both the Pro-
portional (transformed = 4.86, nontransformed = $261,000) and the Dollar Limit condi-
tions (transformed = 4.88, nontransformed = $107,000; p < .001 by post hoc pair wise 
comparisons using Tukey’s test) that did not differ from each other. 
Also as expected, the mean punitive award assessed against a defendant whose con-
duct had been highly reprehensible (transformed = 5.18, nontransformed = $662,015) 
was greater than the punitive award assessed against a defendant whose conduct was only 
mildly reprehensible (transformed = 4.90, nontransformed = $636,166). 
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Compensatory Damage Awards 
We wondered if jurors would augment their compensatory awards when punitive 
damages were limited or disallowed, particularly in a situation in which the defendant’s 
conduct had been portrayed as highly reprehensible. 
Mean Compensatory Awards 
We conducted a 2 (Reprehensibility) × 4 (Punitive Damage Limit) ANOVA on the 
mean transformed compensatory damage awards. There was a signifi cant effect of Puni-
tive Damage Limit on compensatory awards, F(3, 312) = 6.37, p < .001, η2 = .06 but no 
effect of Reprehensibility (p = .45) or signifi cant interaction (p = .59). Pairwise compar-
isons (Tukey’s) for the effect of Punitive Damage Limit showed that the mean compen-
satory award in the No Punitive Award condition was signifi cantly higher than the mean 
award in all the other three conditions (all p’s < .01) and that those three means did not 
differ from each other. These data are shown in Table 1. 
The absence of a Punitive Damage Limit × Reprehensibility interaction suggests that 
mock jurors were apparently not more likely to augment their compensatory award to off-
set limitations in their punitive awards when the defendant had acted egregiously. More 
generally, the lack of difference in compensatory awards in the No Limit condition (where 
jurors could award any amount of punitive damages) and the Dollar and Proportional 
Limit Conditions (where punitive damages were capped) suggests that mock jurors did 
not augment their compensatory awards when punitive damages were explicitly capped. 
Variability in Compensatory Awards 
A justifi cation for imposing caps on punitive damages is that it will reduce the vari-
ability of jurors’ damage awards (Zoebel, 1996). But we wondered if a cap on punitive 
awards would actually increase the variability in compensatory damage awards. To test 
this notion, we calculated a deviation score for each compensatory award by determin-
ing the absolute distance between that particular award and the mean award for that ex-
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perimental condition. (See Levene, 1960, and Saks et al., 1997 for a description of this 
technique.) These data were also collapsed across case type and normalized with a log-10 
transformation before being subjected to a 2 × 4 ANOVA. 
There were main effects of both Punitive Damage Limit (p < .001) and Reprehensi-
bility (p < .001) on the deviation scores but these were subsumed by the Punitive Dam-
age Limit × Reprehensibility interaction, F(3, 312) = 9.37, p < .01, η2 = .08. These data 
are shown in Table 2. 
If, as Zoebel (1996) suggests, capping the punitive damage award is effective in re-
ducing award variability, then we would expect to fi nd signifi cant differences between 
the conditions where punitive awards were capped and those in which they were not. We 
found evidence of this pattern in the High Reprehensibility conditions (where the variabil-
ity in awards in the Dollar Limit and Proportional Limit conditions was signifi cantly less 
than the variability in the No Limit condition) and a hint of the pattern in the Low Rep-
rehensibility condition (where the variability in the Dollar Limit condition was less than 
that of the No Limit condition). Additional pairwise comparisons (Tukey’s) revealed that 
the condition with the greatest variability in compensatory awards was the No Punitive 
Award/Low Reprehensibility condition and that the variability in this award was signifi -
cantly larger than any other award. 
Total Award
The highest compensatory awards came from jurors who were not given the oppor-
tunity to award punitive damages. This fi nding suggests that jurors may not make the dis-
tinctions between compensatory and punitive damages that the law intends (Greene, 1989) 
but rather, that they may reason more holistically and award amounts that they believe 
constitute a suffi cient total award. By this reasoning, when jurors are unable to punish 
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and deter the defendant by way of a punitive damage award, they may do so by increasing 
the size of the compensatory damages they award to the plaintiff. Thus, the compensato-
ry award in the No Punitive Award Condition would approximate the total (compensatory 
plus punitive) award in the No Limit Condition. 
To test this notion, we conducted a 2 × 4 ANOVA using, as the dependent variable, 
the total award from the conditions in which punitive damages were allowed and the com-
pensatory award from the condition in which they were not. We found a signifi cant effect 
of Punitive Damage Limit, F(3, 312) = 4.04, p < .01, η2 = .04. Post hoc pairwise compar-
isons (Tukey’s) revealed that, as expected, the mean compensatory award in the No Puni-
tive Award condition did not differ from the mean total award in the No Limit condition 
(p = 26) and that these awards were both signifi cantly larger than the total awards in the 
Dollar Limit and Proportional Limit conditions. These data are shown in Table 3. There 
was no effect of Defendant Reprehensibility or a Defendant Reprehensibility × Punitive 
Damage Limit interaction on the mean total awards. 
Jurors’ Intentions in Awarding Damages 
Recall that we asked participants to tell us, after they had assessed damages in each 
case, to what extent each award was intended to meet various goals related to damages. 
First, they noted to what extent their compensatory award was intended to (a) make up for 
the losses incurred by the plaintiff, (b) punish the defendant, and (c) deter the defendant 
and similar others. Second, they noted the extent to which their punitive award was in-
tended to meet each of these three goals. 
If their reasoning was consistent with the law’s intentions, they would have said that 
the compensatory award was intended to make up for losses but not to punish or deter, 
and that their punitive award was intended to punish and deter but not to make up for 
the plaintiff’s losses. If they felt that the cap on the punitive award restricted their ability 
to adequately punish and deter the defendant, then jurors in those conditions might have 
used the compensatory damage award to also serve those functions. 
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We analyzed the data with a 2 (Defendant Reprehensibility) × 4 (Punitive Damage 
Limit) × 3 (Question Type: Making up for losses; Punishing; Deterring) mixed ANOVA. 
Defendant Reprehensibility and Punitive Damage Limit were between-participant factors 
and Question Type was a within-participant factor. We conducted separate analyses for re-
sponses in reference to compensatory damages and to punitive damages. 
There were no effects of Defendant Reprehensibility or Punitive Damage Limit on 
responses to these questions for either type of award. Nor were there any interaction ef-
fects. The lack of an effect of Punitive Damage Limit partially complements the quanti-
tative data on damages: jurors who have limitations on allowable punitive awards appar-
ently do not use the compensatory award as a vehicle for meeting the punishment and 
deterrence objectives of punitive damages. Surprisingly, jurors in the No Punitive Award 
condition were not more likely than other jurors to say that their compensatory awards 
were intended to punish or deter and yet, relative to compensatory awards from other con-
ditions, theirs were the highest (see Table 1). 
There were effects of Question Type on responses in reference to both kinds of 
awards, however. We describe these below. 
Intent of Compensatory Damage Awards
There were signifi cant differences in ratings of intent relative to compensatory dam-
age awards, F(2, 624) = 64.66, p < .001, η2 = .21. Mock jurors said that their compensato-
ry damage awards were more intended to make up for the plaintiff’s losses than to punish 
or deter. The difference between mean ratings for the Punishment and Deterrence ques-
tions was not signifi cant (p = .34). These means are shown in Table 4.
 
Intent of Punitive Damage Awards 
There were also signifi cant differences in intent ratings relative to punitive damages, 
F(2, 468) = 3.72, p < .05, η2 = .05. Mock jurors said that their punitive awards were more 
intended to punish than to deter or to make up for losses. The mean ratings for these two 
questions were not signifi cantly different (p = .38). These data are also shown in Table 4. 
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Although the results for Question Type were signifi cant, we note that the differenc-
es in mean ratings for the punitive damages questions were not large, for example, the rat-
ed effectiveness of the punitive award for punishing the defendant was 6.15 and for mak-
ing up for plaintiff’s losses, 5.86 (on a 10-point scale). Further, if mock jurors are really 
disregarding punishment and deterrence issues in their compensatory awards, then one 
would expect their mean ratings to be lower than 5.90 and 5.84, respectively. So, although 
jurors perceive the compensatory award (but not the punitive award) to be the appropri-
ate vehicle for repayment and the punitive award (but not the compensatory award) to be 
a means of punishing the defendant, we are not particularly sanguine that jurors are adher-
ing to the law’s objectives. That the deterrence goal was not a prominent feature of the pu-
nitive damages decision is perhaps not surprising. Because we gave no information about 
the defendant’s fi nancial condition, it may have been diffi cult for mock jurors to use the 
punitive award as a means of deterrence. In addition, others (Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, 
1999) report that punishment plays a much larger role in mock jurors’ thoughts about pu-
nitive damages than does deterrence. 
DISCUSSION 
Much of the rhetoric concerning tort reform has occurred in the absence of empiri-
cal investigation. That situation has begun to change in the very recent past, however, as 
social scientists have begun to assess some of the effects of statutorily imposed attempts 
to reform punitive damages assessments (Anderson & MacCoun, 1999; Robbennolt & 
Studebaker, 1999). The present study complements the results of other recent studies in 
showing that there are unexpected effects of one important and highly controversial legis-
lated reform: the limiting of punitive damage awards. 
Our data show that jurors who were not given the opportunity to award punitive dam-
ages in three kinds of cases (personal injury, products liability, and insurance bad faith) 
augmented the amount that they awarded in compensatory damages. Jurors who had no 
option to award punitive damages apparently infl ated their compensatory damage award 
to serve punitive ends.4 In fact, our data show that the compensatory damages awarded by 
these jurors were statistically equivalent to the total amount (compensatory plus punitive) 
awarded by jurors whose punitive damage awards were not limited in any way. 
We found no effects of other limitations of punitive awards (absolute dollar limit or 
proportional limit) on compensatory damages. So, for example, the compensatory awards 
from jurors with a $200,000 limit on punitive damages were not higher than those from 
4 Interestingly, jurors who had no option to award punitive damages did not tell us that they intended the 
compensatory award to punish and deter, however. It may be that they augmented their compensatory 
awards without clearly distinguishing compensatory goals from punitive goals. Perhaps they lacked 
awareness of the factors that infl uenced their awards (Wilson, 1985).Alternatively, their responses 
may be explained by demand characteristics. They may simply have inferred that compensatory 
damages are supposed to compensate and that punitive damages are supposed to punish. 
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jurors with no limit on punitive damages. This fi nding is especially remarkable given that 
the caps we imposed on punitive damages were more restrictive than is typically the case 
and would have, we suspected, resulted in more crossover into compensatory awards than 
is typically the case. And yet, we found no augmentation of compensatory awards even 
when punitive damages were restricted to $200,000. It appears from these data that as 
long as jurors are given the opportunity to award some money for purposes of punishment 
and deterrence, they do not feel the need to increase their compensatory award to meet 
those objectives. One might test this hypothesis by lowering the cap on punitive damages 
even further to see if and at what point jurors start to augment their compensatory awards. 
We wondered if jurors would be likely to infl ate their compensatory award when pu-
nitive awards were disallowed (or severely limited) and when the defendant had acted in 
a highly reprehensible manner. We reasoned that jurors would want to punish the defen-
dant for his egregious conduct and that the only means available to them was through the 
compensatory award. But, like other researchers (Anderson & MacCoun, 1999; Cather 
et al., 1996), we found no effect of defendant reprehensibility on the amount of the com-
pensatory damage award. One explanation of this null fi nding is that our reprehensibili-
ty manipulation, although successful, was relatively weak: recall that the mean punitive 
awards in response to less reprehensible and more reprehensible conduct differed by only 
$30,000. (Recall also that our manipulations were identical to those used by Cather et al. 
Finally, it is worth noting that there is no absolute standard that equates with egregious or 
reprehensible behavior; so our notion of reprehensible conduct may not have been per-
ceived as such.) Had the defendant’s behavior been clearly reckless or intentional, we 
might have seen an effect of defendant reprehensibility on compensatory awards when 
punitive awards were capped or disallowed. In those situations, jurors might feel especial-
ly desirous of condemning the defendant’s conduct, yet they would have no vehicle but 
the compensatory award to allow them to do so. 
Next, we turn to the variability in compensatory damage awards. Recall that Rob-
bennolt and Studebaker (1999) found differences in compensatory award variability as a 
function of the cap on punitive damages. So did we. In fact, our pattern of results is very 
similar to theirs. We found that capping the punitive damage award generally reduced the 
variability in compensatory damage awards. 
Finally, we examine the effects of our manipulations on the punitive damage awards. 
As expected, mock jurors assessed higher punitive damages against the more errant defen-
dants and when their awards were not limited. These fi ndings suggest that in setting punitive 
damages, jurors are indeed attentive to the egregious nature of the defendant’s conduct and 
that limitations on punitive damages obviously result in reduced awards of that type. 
Summarizing our quantitative fi ndings, we fi nd both good news and troubling news. 
The good news is that mock jurors in our study, like those in Cather et al. (1996), seemed 
to appropriately compartmentalize their decision making about compensation and punish-
ment/deterrence in three civil tort cases. They did not augment their compensatory dam-
age awards when their punitive awards were limited. They were also not more likely to 
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augment the compensatory award when the defendant’s conduct was highly reprehensible 
(vs. less reprehensible), although this fi nding may be an artifact of a weak manipulation of 
defendant’s conduct. By contrast, mock jurors were attentive to the reprehensibility of the 
defendant’s conduct when they assessed punitive damages, as the law would intend them 
to be. Finally, limiting the punitive damage award reduced the variability in the compen-
satory award as well as the mean punitive award. These fi ndings provide some tentative 
support to the notion that limiting the punitive damage award will decrease the size and 
variability of damage awards generally. We found no evidence for the hypothesized cross-
over effect, at least in the conditions where punitive damages were capped. Mock jurors 
did not “compensate for the constraint” (Anderson and MacCoun, 1999) in their punitive 
damage decision making by infl ating their compensatory award. 
The troubling news is this: when jurors were not allowed to award punitive damages, 
they infl ated the level of their compensatory awards. This fi nding, consistent with Ander-
son and MacCoun’s data, suggests that jurors who have no option to award punitive dam-
ages may nonetheless fi nd an alternative avenue for punishing the defendant. These fi nd-
ings support the notion that jurors may have an overall impression of what an injury is 
worth and, rather than concerning themselves with the damage components as an accoun-
tant might, instead search for a sum that is felt to be appropriate (Kalven, 1958). 
There are obvious limitations to the conclusions of our study. Although we exam-
ined the impact of caps in three kinds of cases and found no differential effects of our ma-
nipulations in these three causes of action, all of our summaries were greatly abbreviated 
and lacked some degree of legal realism and vividness. We did not include some informa-
tion that could have affected awards (e.g., concerning the defendant’s fi nancial status, the 
conditions that trigger liability for punitive damages). In particular, requests or counter-
requests for damages by the parties in these cases might have moderated our fi ndings by 
serving as anchors for resulting awards. Further, our mock jurors were college students. 
Although students and jury-pool subjects tend to make decisions in similar ways (Born-
stein, 1999), we cannot be sure to what extent the effects of our independent variables 
would hold with a different population. Finally, our participants did not deliberate. Jury 
discussions about damages can be complex and motivated by subtle attempts at persuasion 
and compromise (Greene, 1989). Obviously, our mock jurors missed this opportunity. 
With these caveats in mind, we briefl y ponder the policy implications of our fi ndings. 
Our data tentatively support the assumption that limitations on punitive damage awards 
may reduce the size of punitive awards and the variability of compensatory awards with-
out simultaneously infl ating the size of the latter. This sanguine fi nding, in conjunction 
with the fact that legislative caps simplify courts’ review of the amount of the awards in 
additur/remittitur (Baldus et al., 1995), might argue for the implementation and continued 
use of damage caps. 
However, we note the concerns of others (e.g., Baldus et al., 1995; Galanter & Lu-
ban, 1993) that legislative caps raise serious ethical and policy questions. Because of in-
consistencies across states in laws limiting punitive damages, similarly injured plaintiffs 
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may receive radically different compensation in different locales. Further, serious ineq-
uities may exist in how tortfeasors are dealt with. Wildly malicious defendants may es-
cape signifi cant sanction in some jurisdictions but not others. Because legislative caps 
may bear little relation to the amount of money required to actually punish and deter, they 
may undercut the very premise of punitive damages (Baldus et al.). Therefore, we advo-
cate for further empirical research along these lines, tempered by careful and thoughtful 
applications of the research fi ndings in setting future policy. 
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